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I. Introduction
Few problems have stimulated economic research like those of wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment. Today, one can hardly claim that we lack theoretically consistent explanations for why the labor market evidently does not clear. While the profession has been successful in presenting possible explanations to these phenomena, it has been less successful in presenting evidence that support or reject individual theories. This is hardly surprising, as many of the recently most fashionable theories involve nonobservable variables like effort, asymmetries in information, etc, which makes it difficult -or even impossible -to implement traditional quantitative methods.
In light of such difficulties a growing literature has turned to interview surveys among price-and wage setters for evidence that may help in discriminating between the competing theoriesj see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) , Blinder and Choi (1990) , Blinder (1991) , Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Kaufman (1984) .
According to the received view on the proper methodology of economics, such unorthodox evidence carries little weight. Economie research is of ten considered to be too serious a business to be based on the informed views of firms and households.
However, and as emphasized by Blinder (1991) , economics can not well afford to follow such advice: 'The imperfect knowledge we can pick up from interviews and questionnaires should ... not be compared to some epistemological ideal, but to the imperfect knowledge that nonexperimental scientists can deduce theoretically or glean from econometric studies. By this more reasonable standard of evidence, data culled from interviews certainly look admissible ' (p. 91) .
While the results of any single interview study should be treated with suspicion, even a skeptic ought to pay some attention to the results if several surveys point in the same direction. Keeping this in mind we have recently completed an interview survey among personnel managers and senior wage negotiators in a sample of Swedish manufacturing companies. The purpose of this paper is to document our survey, summarize the maln fin dings, and compare our results to those obtained by other researchers in the area. Our focus is quite similar to that of Kaufman (1984) and Blinder and Choi (1990) , namely to pin-point the nature and sources of wage rigidity at the firm level. Apart from trying to organize some stylized facts on wage setting in practice, we also try -Hke Kaufman and Blinder and Choi -to discriminate between alternative theories of sticky wages.
We based our sample on a data register compiled by the Swedish Association of compiled a wealth of background statistics on the firms included in our sample, that may be used for deepened analysis. We have also added data on the unemployment rate in municipalities where the individual firms are located.
Since the earl)' 19808 Swedish wage bargaining has undergone profound changes.
The nation-wide baTgaining system, involving the confederations of employers and unions, dissolved and bargaining took place only at the level of the firm and of the industry. At the same time, the unions' long-standing 'solidarity wage policy' became more difficult to uphold. Nevertheless, Swedish labor market institutions still differ substantially from those of Britain and the U.S.A, and our a priori guess was that this was to be reflected in our survey. However, whiIe our results suggest that country specific mechanisms relating to unions and labor market legislation have some effect, they also indicate that other, and more general, mechanisms are at least as important.
Like Blinder and Choi, we find strong support for theories based on relative wages and on the motivationai role of wages. Even in the highly unionized Swedish economy, efficiency wage eonsiderations seem to apply and, like Blinder and Choi, we find that notions of fairness playan important role. U nUke them, however, we also conclude that models based on adverse seleetion are not far off the mark. The influenee of quality signals also extends beyond underbidders to long-term unemployment and labor market programs -most firms eonsider job seekers in either of these states as potentially less productive. We receive rather mixed support for the shirking model; while most firms acknowledge that they monitor employees, the penalties against repeated shirking are not those that the shirking model prediets. In line with the labor turnover model, we also find that the risk of quits is negatively correlated with the average wage levels of firms.
Our results suggest that inside forees are important determinants of pay. Firm speeifie factors like profitability and 'ability to pay' seem to affect wage settlements.
This finding points towards a number of rent sharing models but is at odds with the competitive one. The evidenee was rat her mixed when we confronted respondents with the full ehain of argument in the basic insider-outsider story. While the average firm remains skeptieal, firms with a large share of white collar workers have a more positive attitude towards the model. To the extent that the cost of replacing a white collar worker is higher than that for a blue eollar worker, this is what one should expect.
An important part of our survey cancerns underbidding. Unemployment may persist for either of two reasons. Unemployed workers may refrain from underbidding, and firms may be reluctant to hire underbidders. Our evidence suggests that the more interesting issue concerns the behavior of firms; underbidding is not all that uncommon, but firms regularly reject the offer. The most of ten cited reasons are that hiring an underbidder would violate the internal wage structure, and that underbidders are low quality workers. Such respanses point to a number of theories, including efficiency wage models based on fair wages and adverse selection.
A final observation is that any theory of wage stickiness must account for the fact that workers are heterogeneous. The answers provided of ten depend crucially on the type of worker involved. Employees' perceived norms of fairness, firms' potential for effort monitoring, and the frequeney of underbidding all depend on the type of workers involved.
In the next section, we describe our sample and survey design in some detail.
Seetion III overviews our evidenee, while the concluding section takes on the more challenging task of tentatively evaluating the relevance of alternative theories of pay and unemployment. We provide an English translation of our questionnaire in the Appendix.
II. Sample and survey design
The 300 firms included in the register of the Swedish Association of Industries employ approximately 40 percent of all employees in the manufaeturing sector. The register is designed to provide a balanced coverage of the manufacturing industry at the two-digit ISIC level. Of the firms included in the register, 27 percent have more than 1000 employees, 32 percent are in the 500-1000 interval, and the remaining 41 percent have less than 500 employees.
We sent out our questionnaire in November 1991, together with an accompanying letter, in which we explained our purpose and asked for the cooperation from either the personnel manager or a senior wage negotiator. We also urged respondents to eall in additional expertise if neeessary (personnel managers in large firms may not be involved in wage bargaining with blue eollar workers). By January 1992 we had received 120 answers. In February 1992 we sent out areminder, that by early April had resulted in an additional 59 replies. In total we thus obtained a final 5 sample of 179 firms, implying a response rate of 60 percent.
As a simple check of sample representativeness, we asked firms to compare their overall wage level with that applying in other firms in the same industry. The resulting perceived wage distribution is given in Figure 1 . Clearly, there is a tendency towards a high-wage bias -the average firm considers its wage level as somewhat higher than that applying in other firms. Table 1 provides the industri al breakdown of our sample. The heavy dominance of machinery and equipment is not surprising, given its traditional role in Swedish manufacturing. Table 2 gives the sample distribution by employment. Firms range in size from 38 to 15 800 emp}oyees. As in the study of Blinder and Choi, our sample includes a few very large firms; while the median number of employees is 574, the mean is 1154. Although the original register provides an extensive coverage of large and medium sized firms (note the cluster of firms in the 200-500 interval), it is not representative when it comes to small firms. In our final sample, only 7 firms have less than 100 employees. By necessity, personal interviews drastically reduce sample size. Furthermore, the anonymity of a mail survey is a safeguard against interviewer bias. However, the other side of the coin is that personal interviews provide a potentially much greater source of information -the interviewer may simply ask the respondent to digress on any interesting issue that turns up during the course of the interview. That in-depth interviews with a few key respondents may be highly fruitful is nicely illustrated by previous work on local wage formation in Sweden by Nilsson (1987) and Elvander (1991) shirking to be a non-problem. Even if they are all wrong, the perception that the shirking problem does not exist renders the shirking model irrelevant. Whether they are true or false, the popular models of economic agents are important (see e.g. Shiller (1989) , for an extensive treatment of the role of popular models in asset markets). A more basic problem is due to the fact that many of our questions deal with rather delicate Jabor-management relations. As a consequence, respondents may have an incentive to dress-up their answers; even if a personnel manager perceives shirking to be a problem, it might be hard to admit it. To minimize the risk of such strategic considerations, we were careful to promise all respondents that their replies would be given a confidential treatment, and that the purpose of our survey was 'strictly scientific' .
2 By doing so we believe that we obtain much more information than if simple Yes/No answers were required, as in the Blinder and Choi study. For example, when asking about shirking model, it seems more meaninld"ul to ask about the frequency of shirking in a firm, (a question which allows for a balanced response) than to ask if shirking sometimes occur (a question which requires a yes j no response).
Before proceeding to the evidence, a word about the business cyc1e is in order.
Only a few years aga many respondents would have dismissed our questions as unintelligible or at best irrelevant. In a situation when a lack of manpower is the key headache of personnel officers, much patience is certainly required to spend an hour thinking about the structure and causes of unemployment. The Swedish krona was devaluated with 10 per cent in 1981, and by an additional 16 percent in 1982. Eight years of brisk GDP growth followed, reducing unemployment to an unprecedented low of 1.4 percent in 1989. The problems of an overheated economy came to dominate the public debate, while the unemployment issue more or less vanished from the agenda.
By the time we conducted our survey all that had changed. By the end of 1990
the Swedish economy headed for its deepest recession since the 1930s. Decreased international competitiveness and slackened domestic demand struck hard on all sectors of the economy. The traditional policy responses were considered -and rejected. Expansion of public sector employment ran counter to the govern men t 's long-term goal of trimming the large public sector, and further devaluations would underrnine the credibility of the government's anti inflationary stance. As a consequence the burden of adjustment was shifted to the labor market and the wage bargaining insti t u tions.
By earl y 1992, when we conducted our survey, the overall unemployment rate had risen to 4.1 per cent The fall in industrial production and industrial employment was more dramatic. Compared to the previous peak, industrial output was down by about 14 percent and industrial employment by about 17 percent. The sh arp business downturn is clearly evident in our material. Among 179 responding firms, no less than 68 percent reported that they had had redundancies over the last year.
III. An overview of the evidence
A. Underbidding
Unemployment problems would not arise if laid off workers would underbid those employed and if firms would hire the underbidders. A first set of questions focused on underbidding. Do unemployed workers ever offer to work for less than the going wage rate, and, if so, will the firm employ them? In a highly unionized economy as the Swedish one, it is easy to think of reasons why underbidding should be more or less nonexistent. With an overwhelming majority of blue collar workers covered by collective bargaining agreements (protected by Swedish private law) extending also to nonunion workers, many firms that attempt to hire underbidders will end up in the labor court. Knowing this, unemployed blue collar workers may not find underbidding worthwhile. A related argument is that unions and legislation simply codify existing social norms. If established community norms of fairness rules out underbidding, they will serve as an effective constraint on the unemployed (see e.g. Solow (1990».
Our first question on underbidding (question 2.b in the Appendix) was the following:
Does your company presently have externaI job applicants (applying either directly or via job agencies) that offer to work for less than the going wage for employees with the same qualifications and experience? (The question should be answered also if your company presently has no vacancies and if loeal union or collective bargaining contracts pl'event these people from being hired.)
Much to our surprise, underbidding does not appear to be all that uncommon.
Underbidding also seems to be more of a white-collar phenomenon: Nine percent of the respondents (16 firms) reported underbidding blue-collar workers, and 13 percent (23 firms) did the same for white collar workers. We also asked firms about the occurrence of underbidding in the past (question 2.c), and found a quite similar pattern. While underbidding is not a very frequent phenomenon, almost 43 percent of the firms had encountered blue collar workers offering to work for less than the going wage, and 53 percent had encountered white coli ar workers seeking job in the same way. As very low unemployment rates used to characterize Sweden (before the present crisis, unemployment never exceeded 3.5 percent during the post World War II period), we find these figures unexpectedly high.
While underbidding is a necessary prerequisite for flexible wages in the downward direction, it is clearly not a sufficient one. Firms must also be willing to hire them, an occurrence which seems less likely (question 2.d). Among the firms that had at least sometimes in the past been approach ed by underbidding blue collar workers, 93 percent had always or nearly always rejected the offer (those answering with 1, 2 or 3 on our integer scale). Among the firms that had been approached by underbidding white collar workers, 84 percent had always or nearly always rejected the offer. Unlike
Solow, who concludes that the absence of wage under cutting is a key fact of life that should be accounted for in models of unemployment (Solow (1990) , p. 38), we are left with the conclusion that the more interesting question concerns the behavior of firms:
While unemployed workers do knock on the factory gate to a surprising extent, considering the high rejection rates, firms keep it locked.
We asked all firms that always rejected underbidders why this was so (question 2.e). The most of ten cited reasons were -see Table 4 -that hiring underbidders would violate the firm's wage policy and create internai inequities (38 percent of the firms gave this answer), and that underbidders were considered to have inferior skills (34 percent). These findings do point towards several arguments proposed in the literature (we will return to these issues later on). The idea that firms care about their internal wage structure is central to both management literature and fair wage theorizing, and is weIl in line with the predictions of the insider-outsider model. The idea that a willingness to work for less than the going wage signals low productivity is central to 13 efficiency wage models of the adverse selection variety. Note: Question 2.e in the Appendix was put to all firms that claimed that theya) had encountered underbidders, and, b) never hired them.
We obtained less support for the plausible view that legislation and collective bargaining agreements is an important check on the hiring of underbidders; only Il percent of the firms referred to the going wage contract as an important factor. In the case of white coIlar workers, this should come as no surprise. As there is no set salary structure (apart from that prescribed by habits and conventions), firms have considerable discretion in setting entry salaries for new employees. There are also ways to circumvent the collective bargaining agreement (which applies to all blue collar workers ), for example to redassify a job applicant into a lower job -and hence wagecategory. However, firms' willingness to try such measures is likely to depend on the strength of the local union. As our correlation analysis makes dear, the more unionized 14 the firm is the smaller is the likelihood that an underbidder will be hired.
(Underbidders, however, do not seem to discriminate between more or less unionized firms; there is no correlation between unionization and the frequency of underbidding.) If the laws WE're changed so that your company was given agreater opportunity to fire employees, the threat of being replaced by unemployed and cheaper workers would lead to lower wage demands.
Judging from Figure 2 the evidence is rather mixed. Although about 13 percent of the firms considered the statement as very unlikely, and an additional 38 percent held it as rather unlikely (Le. respondents answering with 2, 3 or 4 on our integer scale), a minority did a.gree. On balance, however, there seems little reason to believe that LAS is a very important determinant of nominal wage rigidity. For a majority of finns, LAS may simply serve to formalize established norms of proper conduct -replacing incumbent workers with unemployed underbidders was probably a bad idea even before the introduction of LAS. Most firms appear to associate LAS with higher recruiting costs -a substantial majority agreed that LAS made them more careful in screening job seekers (Figure 3 ).
High recruiting costs may also affect the cyc1ical movement of employment; cf. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1992) . In an economy with high recruiting One theory to explain why wages may end up above the level that gives full employment is based on the idea that hirings and firings are costly to firms. These costs (associated with employment interviews, advertisements, retraining, redundancy payment, etc) make firms prone to reduce labor turnover and koop workers already employed. This situation can be used by employoos to push up wages. How relevant is this reasoning to your firm?
Firms were not particularly enthusiastic about this mechanism ( Figure 5 ). While costs of labor turnover do soom to be of importance, few firms seem to think of the insider-outsider story as an appropriate way of modeling their economic effects. We found, though, a strong positive correlation between the attitude to the insider-outsider mechanism and the share of white collar workers. Firms with a large share of white collar work ers have on average a much more positive attitude to the mechanism (the average response for the 15 firms with the smallest share of white collar workers was 2.9, for the 15 firms with the largest share of white collar workers it was 4.9). To the extent that it is more costly to employ and train white collar workers than blue collar workers, this is what one would expect. Nickell and Jackman (1991) ). Aecording to many Swedish observers, the same system is likely to produce wage inflation and probably also unemployment, since it involves at least two layers of wage inereases; first eentralized industry level bargaining sets the floor for national wage inereases, and then loeal level bargaining between individuaI firms and Ioeal unions means additional pay inereases (see e.g. Lindbeck (1993) ). This latter line of reasoning lies at the heart of recent proposals from the Swedish Employers' Federation (SAF) to limit wage bargaining to the 10eaI level. We confronted firms with the following question (question 4):
An important issue in the diseussion on wage formation is how the Swedish bargaining system affeets wage eosts. How do you think that wage increases in your company should be affeeted if the bargaining system was ehanged so that negotiations only took place at the Ioeal level (Le. direetly between the firm and the local union with its own right to call a strike) and not at all on the central or industry level?
There was no cIear eonsensus on the benefits from a move from the eurrent system with both central and loeal bargaining to a system with only Ioeal bargaining. It is indeed hard to eseape the eonclusion that firms are mueh less convineed about the advantages of decentralized bargaining than their own central federation ( Figure 6 ). Of 179 firms, 84 thought that wage inereases would go down, 39 believed that they would be unchanged, anå 56 answered that they would be higher. There was also a marked differenee between small and large establishments; small and medium sized firms were more likely to associate decentralized bargaining with higher wages. The correlation eoefficient between firm size and the answer to question 4 in the Appendix is -0.23.
(The average number of employees of the firrns that thought that wage inereases would go down is 1660, for those that believed that wage inereases would go up it is 764.) An important issue in the discussions on wage formation is how the Swedish bargaining system affects wage costs. How do you think that wage increases in your company should be affected if the bargaining system was changed so that negotiations only took place at the local level (i.e., directly between the finn and the local union with its own right to call a strike) and not at all on the central or industry leve!? Wage increases would become: (Q4 Although the Swedish economy is highly unionized, previous eeonometric studies indicate that efficiency wage considerations still apply (see Holmiund (1992) , Arai, (1990) , and Ackum Agell, (1993) ). This is of course what we may expect: Even if firms ean not unilaterally set an optimal efficiency wage satisfying some version of the Solow-condition, the wage agreed upon by firm and union may still influence firms' ability to motivate, recruit and retain workers. A number of questions were designed to shed further light on these influences.
An implication common to most efficiency wage s tories is that out side opportunities affect effort on the job. Most firms aeeepted this contention. An overwhelming majority of firms thought that an inerease in the loeal unemployment 20 rate would stimulate work effort ( Figure 7) . A substantiai majority also believed that 'grateful' to be employed. According to the shirking model, higher unemployment or lower unemployment benefits increase effort, as they raise the economic penalty of being caught as a shirker.
The shirking model rests on three premises. First, workers dislike effort on the job. Second, it is costly to monitor effort. Third, there must be some economie penal ty for workers that are detected as shirkers. When we confronted firms with these issues we obtained a rather mixed picture. While most finns acknowledged that employees sometimes shirk on the job, shirking does not seem to be a very common phenomenon "To what extent does your firm monitor the average work effort of a group of employees?", most firms answered with 5 or above (quest.ion 6.a). We may also note that the extent of monitoring seems to depend on the type of workers involved;
blue-collar workers are on average more intensely monitored.
Matters became more puzzling when we turned to the penalties invoked on employees caught shirking. When we asked, "Which is the most common measure taken against employees who repea.tedly are caught shirking?", we found that a simple verbal rebuke (which presumably imposes a psychic -but not monetary -cost) is the by far most common penalty ( Figure 1O .a-d). Penalties with an explicit eeonomic content were very rare; elose to 70 pereent of the firms would never fire a deteeted shirker, and an additional 20 pereent answered that they would almost never dismiss a shirker. Another 63 pereent ruled out wage euts, and only 14 pereent answered by a figure greater than 2. 3 Such responses are not easy to reeoneile with the shirking model.
If a majority of workers really derive utility from shirking, we would expeet these lax penalties to come hand in hand with ineentive problems on a massive scale, no matter the extent of monitoring.
E. Relative wages
An old keynesian theme is that workers' are eoneemed about relative wages, and that this mayereate involuntary unemployment. This theme reemerges in many modern theories of unemployment. As pointed out by Summers (1988) , most efficiency wage arguments ultimately boil down to the idea that relative wages (within or aeross establishments) affect labor produetivity. There was much consensus that employees care about relative wage leveis, either directly or through their union representatives (Figures l1.a-d and 12.a-d) .
However, the standard of comparison seems to differ between different types of Employees' standard of comparison seem to extend weIl beyond other groups of employees. Most firms acknowledged that loeal unions pushed for higher wages in times of high company profits (question 8.c). We also asked whether high dividends lead to higher wage claims (question 8.d), but this does not seem to be the case -while
Iocal unions care about profitabiIity , they appear to see through the corporate veil. 4
What are we to make out of these findings? The observation that relative wages figure prominent ly in loeal wage bargains is not by itself a very strong indication of any particular mode! of the labor market. Indeed, even if the simple competitive model was the correct one, we eould not rule out responses in line with those described above.
In the absence of a walrasian auctioneer, the way to infer the going (competitive) wage rate is presumably to look at wages payable in neighboring firms before quitting a firm that pays non-competitive wages. However, if this competitive explanation for the importance of relative wages was true, we would expect relative wage comparisons to be more important in low-wage firms than in high-wage firms. This does not fit the facts -relative wage comparisons seem equally important in all firms (there are no significant correlations between the overall wage level of the firm and the answers to questions 8.a and 8.b).
Why should profits affeet wage claims? In a competitive labor market, we 4This resuJt is of some interest from a policy point of view. On a few occasions during the 1980s, the Swedish government tri ed to stem the demand for higher wages by a legislated ban on dividend increases. For such a policy to work, however, workers must not be able to see through the corporate veil.
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would not expect a microeconomic link between profitability and wage formation.
There are, however, at least two alternative (nonwalrasian) ways to motivate such a relation (see e.g. Carruth and Oswald (1989) ). The first one is based on the idea that employees have interdependent preferences, and care, for reasons of equity or fairness, about the remuneration of capital owners. The second hinges on the idea that firm and union bargain over rents, and that relative bargaining strength determines the extent of rent sharing.
What happens if the firm tries to uphold an 'unfair' wage structure? We asked firms to assess the likely costs in terms of quits or lowered effort (question 8.e). For senior white collar workers, the risk of quits seems to dominate the risk of reduced effort. The same pattern, though less marked, applies for other white collars. For blue collar workers, the costs of unfairness in wage setting may be bot h in terms of quits and in terms of lower effort. A comparison across skill group s indicates that white collar workers are somewhat more inclined to quit than blue collar workers. From these responses, it is hard to escape the conclusion that firms attach some importance to fairness aspects. Relative wages are important to employees, and the costs of an unfair wage structure may be high. Another observation, in line with the labor turnover version of the efficiency wage model, is that the risk of quits is negatively correlated with firms' overall wage levels. One reason for the fact that nominal wages seldom faUs may be that wage relativities might be altered. Employees want to keep a certain wage hierarchy for different jobs, and reject wage cuts since tradition al wage differences may be aItered. How likely is this explanation for the fact that wage cuts seldom occur?
Although suggestive, our evidence is still not as clear cut as that of Blinder and Choi.
Sixteen of their 19 managers responded that relative wages are important deterrents to nominal wage cuts. On our integer scale the most common answer is fairly probable (42 firms answered with 5). Seventy one firms appear distinctly keynesian (those answering with 6 or above), while 63 firms are more skeptic (those answering with 4 or below).
When we rephrased the question a bit, choosing a lower and more concrete level of abstraction, a more distinctly keynesian picture emerge. Would an identical percentage wage cut for all employees in the own firm be acceptable to save jobs in a crisis? Specifically, we asked how large a share of the overall number of jobs in the firm that must be at stake for a proportionate wage cut to be accepted by all employees (question B.g). More than 80 percent of the firms responded that at least 50 percent of the jobs must be threatened if an across the board wage cut is to be accepted (Table   5) . To most firms, it does not seem possible to suggest proportionate wage cuts unI ess a major share of the jobs in the firm is at stake. Nine percent of the firms answered that not even a closing down of the firm would make their employees agree to a uniform wage reduction. Our simple correlation analysis shows that wage cut resistance is negatively related to the sh are of white collar workers, and positively related to the unionization rate. As these latter variables are highly correlated, we ran a simple regression in search of causal dependence. 6 The results suggest that unionization does not matter, but that the sh are of white colI ar workers has some explanatory power.
G. Inside versus outside determinants of pay
To check some of our previous reasoning we simply asked firms to cite the most im:portant factors that normally determine firms' pay settlements (question 8.h).
Ability to pay (profits and productivity improvements ) was recorded as the single most important factor (Table 6 ). Various indicators of relative wages came in second place. Most firms did not specify which relative wages they had in mind, but for those that did we may conclude that wages in other firms in the region is a more important factor than wages in other firms in the same industry. Fifteen percent of the firms answered that wages in the region mattered, 11 percent that wages in the industry mattered and 38 percent did not specify how the relative wages mattered. On third place was the influence of the centrally negotiated wage agreement, while the "labor market situation" showed up fourth. This mixture of externaI and internaI influences on pay determination is quite typical of other studies in the area (see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) and the evidence cited by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) , Chapter 4). Thus, the finding that ability to pay ranks so high should come as no surprise (it is of course also perfectly in line with our finding that employees often refer to profits in loeal wage negotiations). It does, however, east strong doubt on the eompetitive model of the labor market; aecording to the simple demand and supply model, internal faetors like 30 ability to pay should have no influence on wages.
In a recent econometric study, Holmiund and Zetterberg (1991) reach a conclusion opposite to ours, namely that inside forces in Swedish wage determination are weak. One possible explanation for these contradictory findings, apart from the different methodological approaches, is that Holmlund and Zetterberg rely on an estimation period, 1965-1985, dominated by highly centralized (nationwide) pay setting. As the central bargain for the larger part of their period followed the doctrine of solidarity wage policy, which implied that all wage differentials due to differences in profi tabili t y across firms should be eliminated, inside forces like ability to pay should playa lesser role. However, as the nationwide bargaining system dissolved in 1983, the scope for solidarity wage policy was undermined. Our survey evidence may then simply reflect the move to a new bargaining system, more conducive to rent sharing.
H. Adverse selection and stigmatization
Asymmetric information is a catch-word in much modern theorizing. That firms may pay wages above market clearing leve Is due to unobservable productive characteristics among workers is central to the adverse selection mode l. We have already found that underbidders of ten are considered to have inferior skills -a finding which seems to hold promise for the model. To further explore this possibility, we confronted firms with a number of hypothetical examples, designed to shed light on signaling mechanisms in the labor market. Like Blinder and Choi we asked:
Assume that two persons are competing for the same job. From interviews, E'xperiences, education, etc., both seem equally qualified. One of the two accepts the wage offered by the firm, while the other demands a higher wage. Does the firm consider the latter, who demands a higher wage, to be potentially more productive?
Ten percent of the finns answered that they would never consider a high wage claim as a signal of high productivity. Among the remaining 90 percent, none agreed that they always or almost always would consider a high wage claim to be such a signal. Still, the most common response was 'sometimes' (number 5 on our scale Unobservable productivity differences is a premise for the adverse selection model and to shed more light on the model, we confronted firms with two additional examples. In the first example, two workers are assumed to differ only by the fact that one of them has been unemployed for some time. In the second example they differ only in that one of them has been in alabor market program for some time. In neither case do the two workers differ in measurable productivity. In either case we obtained quite similar answers. Many firms sometimes seem to view unemployment and participation in labor market programs as signals of low productivity (Figures 13 and   14) . 7 Given the ceteris paribus nature of the question, a "yes" or "no" may seem to be the natural options, rather than an integer scale from 1 through 9. However, with detailed answers we may capture the possibility that firms sometimes change policy. For instance, the likelihood that an unemployed person is a lemon may be higher in times of low unemployment than when unemployment is high. Fig.13 Assume that two persons are competing for the same job and that both accept the wage offered by the finn. From interviews, experiences, education, etc., both seem equally qualified.
However,one of the two is unemployed and has been sa for same time. Does the finn consider him to be potentially less productive? It is of course difficult, if not impossible, to prove or disprove individual theories based on interview surveys. As is always the case, questions inval ving judgmental issues invite a certain degree of arbitrariness. Furthermore, also when respondents agree on the importance (or irrelevance) of a certain argument, it is sometimes difficult to diseriminate between theories -quite of ten we find support for an economic mechanism or relation which is crucial to several labor market theories. Still, a relatively consistent picture seems to emerge.
The theories that we want to illuminate are the competitive model, models based on rent-sharing, and efficiency wage models (shirking, turnover, adverse seleetian and fair wages). We also want to shed light on arguments emphasizing the role of institutions (like the bargaining system and labor market laws). To what extent are these models consistent with OUT facts?
Swedish wage setting institutions underwent major changes during the 1980s.
The abandoning of the solidarity wage principle and a less centralized bargaining framework can a priori be expected to provide more scope for firm specific factors. This is reflected in OUT sUTvey, since different measures of ability to pay seem to playan important roIe. The diminished roIe for solidarity wage bargaining does not per se imply that equity aspects are not present. Our survey indicates that workers still care a great deal about relative wages (both within and across firms), and that they try to proteet their position in the wage hierarchy.
That relative wages matter is at least broadly consistent with a competitive labor market; to the extent that the equilibrating process comes about via a transfer of labor from low wage to high wage sectars, relative wages should matter. On the other hand, while profits and productivity (ability to pay) should have no impact on wage formation in this model, our results indicate that ability to pay is important. AIso the fact that unemployment and unemployment benefits affect effort cannot easily be 34 reconciled with a simple demand and supply view of the labor market. Hence, we conc1ude that the competitive model is off the mark.
By contrast, these findings are compatible with many efficiency wage stories, including the shirking model. However, the kind of penalties that firms impose on shirkers is circumstantial evidence against this model. We obtained stronger support for the adverse selection model. Firms of ten seem to perceive underbidders, the unemployed and those in labor market programs to be of lower quality. This implies
. that a premise for the adverse selection model, Le. the presence of signals of low productivity, seems to be fulfilled. We even found that demanding a higher wage may, by some managers, be interpreted as a signal of high productivity.
AIso the labor turnover model is given indirect support in the sense that some basic premises seem to be fulfilled. Swedish labor market legislation seems to have raised turnover costs. Furthermore, the risk of quits is negatively correlated with the average wage level of the firm. Even though we have not investigated whether firms consciously have raised wages to reduce the risk of costly quits, there appears to exist a case for doing so. The fair wage model of Akerlof and others is supported by the fact that relative wages matter a lot and that unemployment is perceived to have a strong impact on effort. AIso that profits matter to wages is consistent with certain versions of the fair wage model (Agell and Lundborg (1992) ).
Many of our findings point towards models based on bargaining and rent-sharing. However, when we asked about one prominent member of this dass of modeis, the insider-outsider model, we got a less positive response. While costs of hirings and firings seem substantial (this is recognized in the answers to our questions concerning job security legislation), firms showed no enthusiasm when we confronted them with a direct statement of the basic mechanism of this model. There are however other versions of the insider-outsider model, stressing harassment activities of incumbent workers, on which our evidence have no bearing.
35
Institutional arrangements like LAS do not seem to matter a great deal to nominal wage rigidity. Like Blinder and Choi, we found that nominal wage rigidity may have much more to do with relative wage comparisons, an observation which points back to traditional keynesian thinking. LAS appears more important in raising turnover costs; Le. costs that may contribute to real wage rigidity .
